A system with sporadic errors (SSE) is a controller which produces high quality output but it may occasionally violate a critical requirement REQ (I, O). A run-time enforcement shield is a controller which takes (I, O) (coming from SSE) as its input, and it produces a corrected output O ′ which guarantees the invariance of requirement REQ(I, O ′ ). Moreover, the output sequence O ′ must deviate from O "as little as possible" to maintain the quality. In this paper, we give a method for logical specification of shields using formulas of logic Quantified Discrete Duration Calculus(QDDC). The specification consists of a correctness requirement REQ as well as a hard deviation constraint HDC which must both be mandatorily and invariantly satisfied by the shield. Moreover, we also use quantitative optimization to give a shield which minimizes the expected value of cumulative deviation in an H-optimal fashion. We show how tool DCSynth implementing soft requirement guided synthesis can be used for automatic synthesis of shields from a given specification. Next, we give logical formulas specifying several notions of shields including the k-Stabilizing shield of Bloem et al. [2, 9] as well as the Burst-error shield of Wu et al. [21] , and a new e, d-shield. Shields can be automatically synthesized for all these specifications using the tool DCSynth. We give experimental results showing the performance of our shield synthesis tool in relation to previous work. We also compare the performance of the shields synthesized under diverse hard deviation constraints in terms of their expected deviation and the worst case burst-deviation latency.
Introduction
A system with sporadic errors (SSE) is a controller which produces high quality desirable output for any given input but it may sporadically violate a critical system requirement REQ (I, O) , where I and O are the set of input and output propositions. Many manually designed controllers have this character, as they embody designer's unspecified optimizations, however they may have obscure design errors. A runtime enforcement shield for a specified critical requirement REQ(I, O) is a controller (Mealy machine) which receives both input and output (I, O) generated by SSE. The shield produces a modified output O ′ which is guaranteed to invariantly meet the critical requirement REQ(I, O ′ ) (correct-by-construction). Moreover, in each run, the shield output O ′ must deviate from the SSE output O "as little as possible", to maintain the quality. This allows the shield to benefit from system designer's optimizations without having to formally specify these or to handle these in the synthesis. See Figure 2 .
A central issue in designing run-time enforcement shields is the underlying notion of "deviating as little as possible" from the SSE output. There are several different notions explored in the literature [2, 9, 21, 20] . In their pioneering paper, Bloem et al. [2] proposed the notion of k-stabilizing shield which may deviate for at most k cycles continuously under suitable assumptions. If assumptions are not met the shield may deviate arbitrarily. This was proposed as a hard requirement which must be mandatorily satisfied by the shield in any behaviour. We call such constraints as hard deviation constraints.
Konighofer et al [9] have proposed some variants of the k-stabilizing shield requirement with and without fail safe state, which are also hard deviation constraints. Specific shield synthesis algorithms have been developed for each of these constraints.
As our first main contribution, we propose a logical specification notation for hard deviation constraints using the formulas of an interval temporal logic QDDC. This logic allows us to succinctly and modularly specify regular properties [13, 11, 12] . With its counting constructs and interval based modalities, it can be used to conveniently specify both the correctness requirement REQ(I, O) as well as the hard deviation constraint HDC.
Criticizing the inability of k-stabilizing shields in handling burst errors, Wu et al. [21, 20] proposed a burst-error shield which enforces the invariance of the correctness requirement, and it locally minimizes the measure of deviation between SSE output O and the shield output O ′ , at each step. An algorithm for the synthesis of such shields was given. We call such a shield as locally deviation minimizing.
In this paper, as our second main contribution, we generalize the Wu technique to minimize the cumulative deviation more globally. An H-optimal shield which minimizes at each point the expected value of cumulative deviation in next H-steps of shield execution is computed. The cumulative deviation is averaged over all possible H length inputs to arrive at the optimal estimate. A well known value iteration algorithm [1, 16] for optimal policy synthesis of Markov Decision Processes allows us to compute such a shield. We call such a shield as H-optimally deviation minimizing. This is a powerful optimization and in the paper we experimentally show its significant impact on performance of the shield. It may be noted that Wu's burst-error shield is obtained by selecting H = 0.
Finally, we propose a uniform method for synthesizing a run-time enforcement shield from given logical specification (REQ, HDC) and a horizon value (natural number) H. The resulting shield invariantly meets the correctness requirement REQ as well as the hard deviation constraint HDC. Moreover, the shield is H-optimally deviation minimizing. The shield synthesis is carried out by using the soft requirement guided controller synthesis tool DCSynth [18] . This tool allows synthesis of H-optimal controllers from specified hard and soft QDDC requirements.
Using the proposed formalism, in the paper, we formulate several diverse notions of shields. These include a logical specification of Bloem's k-stabilizing shield and Wu's burst-error shield, as well as a new notion of e, d-shield. A uniform synthesis method using the tool DCSynth can be applied to obtain the corresponding run-time enforcement shields. It is notable that tool DCSynth uses an efficient BDD-based semi-symbolic representation of automata/controllers with aggressive minimization. This allows the tool to scale better and to produce smaller sized shields. In the paper, we give an experimental evaluation of the performance of our DCSynth tool and compare it with some previously reported studies in the literature.
With the ability to formulate shields with diverse hard deviation constraints, it is natural to ask for a comparison of the performance of these shields. The performance must essentially measure the extent of deviation of the shield output from the SSE output. Towards this, we propose two measures of the shield performance.
• We compute the probability of deviation in long run. For this, we assume that the input to the shield is fully random, with each input variable value chosen independently of the past and each other. While simplistic, this does provide some indication of the shield's effectiveness in average.
• We measure the worst case burst-deviation latency. This gives the maximum number of consecutive deviations possible in the worst case. (If unbounded, we report ∞). A model checking technique implemented in a tool CTLDC [14] allows us to compute this worst case latency.
Tool DCSynth provides facilities for the computation of each of these performance measures for a synthesized shield. The reader may refer to the original papers on DCSynth [18, 15] for details of techniques by which such performance can be measured. In this paper, we synthesize shields with different hard deviation constraints and we provide a comparison of the performance of these shields. This allows us to draw some preliminary conclusions. Clearly, much wider experimentation is needed for firmer insight. The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2.1 describes the syntax and semantics of the logic QDDC. Section 2.3 gives the syntax of DCSynth specification and brief outline of the synthesis method. Section 3 describes the various logical notions of shield specification. Section 4 describes metrics to evaluate the shield performance and corresponding experimental results. In Section 5, we conclude the paper with discussion and related work.
Preliminaries
We provide a brief overview of logic QDDC as well as the soft requirement guided H-optimal controller synthesis method implemented in tool DCSynth. This method and tool is applied to the problem of run-time enforcement shield synthesis in this paper. The reader may refer to the original paper [18] for further details of these preliminaries.
Quantified Discrete Duration Calculus (QDDC) Logic
Let PV be a finite non-empty set of propositional variables. Let σ a non-empty finite word over the alphabet 2 PV . It has the form σ = P 0 · · · P n where
The syntax of a propositional formula over variables PV is given by:
with &&, ||, ! denoting conjunction, dis-junction and negation, respectively. Operators such as ⇒ and ⇔ are defined as usual. Let Ω(PV ) be the set of all propositional formulas over variables PV . Let i ∈ dom(σ ). Then the satisfaction of propositional formula ϕ at point i, denoted σ , i |= ϕ is defined as usual and omitted here for brevity. The syntax of a QDDC formula over variables PV is given by:
where ϕ ∈ Ω(PV ), p ∈ PV , c ∈ N and ⊲⊳∈ {<, ≤, =, ≥, >}.
An interval over a word σ is of the form 
We also define the following derived constructs:
Finally, we define (3) . Figure 1 gives a possible behaviour σ where the last row gives the value of σ , i |= ϕ 3 for each position i. 
This • Let ϕ until (n) be the QDDC formula SinceLast(r,(Until(p,q,n))). 
(D). We call A (D) a formula automaton for D or the monitor automaton for D.
A tool DCVALID implements this formula automaton construction in an efficient manner by internally using the tool MONA [8] . It gives minimal, deterministic automaton (DFA) for the formula D. We omit the details here. However, the reader may refer to several papers on QDDC for detailed description and examples of QDDC specifications as well as its model checking tool DCVALID [13, 11, 12] .
In the rest of the paper we consider QDDC formulas and automata where variables PV = I ∪ O are partitioned into disjoint sets of input variables I and output variables O. Such a formula/automaton specifies a relation between inputs and outputs.
For technical convenience, we define a notion of indicator variable for a QDDC formula (regular property). The idea is that the indicator variable w witnesses the truth of a formula D at any point in execution. Thus, Ind(D, w) = pre f (EP(w) ⇔ D). Here, EP(w) = (true^ w ), i.e. in a behaviour σ and a position i,
. Thus variable w is true exactly at those positions where the past of the position satisfies D. These indicator variables can be used as auxiliary propositions in another formula using the notion of cascade composition ≪ defined below. 
This composition gives a formula over input-output variables (I, O ∪W ).
Cascade composition provides a useful ability to modularize a formula using auxiliary propositions W which witness other regular properties given as QDDC formulas. 
Supervisors and Controllers
Now we consider QDDC formulas and automata where variables PV = I ∪ O are partitioned into disjoint sets of input variables I and output variables O. We show how Mealy machines can be represented as special form of Deterministic finite automata (DFA). Supervisors and controllers are Mealy machines with special properties. This representation allows us to use the MONA DFA library [8] to efficiently compute supervisors and controllers in our tool DCSynth. 
Definition 5 (Output-nondeterministic Mealy Machines). A total and Deterministic Finite Automaton (DFA) over input-output alphabet
Intuition is that the transitions from q ∈ F to r are forbidden (and kept only for making the DFA total). Language of any such Mealy machine is prefix-closed. Recall that for a Mealy machine,
It follows that for all input sequences a non-blocking Mealy machine can produce one or more output sequence without ever getting into the reject state.
For a Mealy machine M over variables
Here σ , ii, oo must have the same length. We will not distinguish between σ and (ii, oo) in the rest of the paper. Also, for any input sequence ii ∈ (2 I ) * , we will define
Definition 6 (Controllers and Supervisors). An output-nondeterministic Mealy machine which is nonblocking is called a supervisor. A deterministic supervisor is called a controller.
The non-deterministic choice of outputs in a supervisor denotes unresolved decision. The determinism ordering below allows supervisors to be refined into controllers.
Definition 7 (Determinism Order and Sub-supervisor). Given two supervisors Sup
. We call Sup 2 to be a sub-supervisor of Sup 1 .
Note that being supervisors, they are both non-blocking, and hence
for any ii ∈ (2 I ) * . The supervisor Sup 2 may make use of additional memory for resolving and pruning the non-determinism in Sup 1 .
DCSynth Specification and Controller Synthesis
This section gives a brief overview of the soft requirement guided controller synthesis method from QDDC formulas. The method is implemented in a tool DCSynth. (See [18] for details). This method and the tool will be used for synthesis of run-time enforcement shields in the subsequent sections. 
Definition 8. A supervisor Sup realizes invariance of QDDC formula D over variables (I, O), denoted as Sup realizes AG
(D), provided L(Sup) ⊆ L(D).
is denoted by MPS(D).
A well-known greatest fixed point algorithm for safety synthesis over A (D) gives us MPS(D) if it is realizable. We omit the details here (see [18] ).
Proposition 9 (MPS Monotonicity). Given QDDC formulas D 1 and D 2 over variables (I, O) such that
, and The controller synthesis goes through following three stages. (MPHOS(D h , D s , H) ). In this section, we give a logical framework for specifying various shields by using the logic QDDC. We then provide an automatic synthesis of a run-time enforcement shield from its logical specification using the tool DCSynth of the previous section. Thus, we achieve a logical specification and a uniform synthesis method for shields.
Deviation constraints specify the extent of allowed deviation in a shield's behaviour. Our specification has hard deviation constraint HDC which must be mandatorily and invariantly satisfied by the shield. (This is similar to the hard requirement in DCSynth.) We also define a canonical soft deviation constraint Hamming(O, O ′ ) which will be useful in minimizing cumulative deviation during synthesis. Overall, a shield specification consists of a pair (REQ, HDC).
Hard Deviation Constraints
Two indicator propositions, SSEOK and Deviation play an important role in formulating hard deviation constraints. Proposition SSEOK indicates whether the SSE is meeting the requirement REQ(I, O) at the current position. Proposition Deviation indicates whether at the current position, the shield output is different from the SSE output. Recall that in DCSynth specifications, the formula Ind(D, w) defines a fresh output proposition w which is true at a position provided the past of the position satisfies formula D (see Definition 3). We use the following list of indicator definitions in formulating hard deviation constraints. Let, O = {o 1 , . . . , o r } and O ′ = {o ′ 1 , . . . , o ′ r }.
INDDEF = Ind( REQ(I, O), SSEOK), Ind( true^
, Deviation) A hard deviation constraint HDC is a QDDC formula over propositions SSEOK and Deviation. It specifies a constraint on Deviation conditional upon the behaviour of SSEOK. In Subsection 3.4, we will give a list of several different hard deviation constraints.
For shield synthesis using DCSynth, we define the QDDC formula HShield given in Equation 1) as the hard requirement over the input-output propositions (I ∪ O, O ′ ). Notice that in its formulation, we use the cascade composition from Definition 3. This allows us to modularize the specification into components REQ and HDC.
The constraint (QDDC formula) HShield must be invariantly satisfied by the shield. Tool DCSynth gives us a maximally permissive supervisor MPS(HShield) with this property (See definition 8). This supervisor can be termed as shield-supervisor without deviation minimization and it will be denoted by MPS(REQ, HDC).
Soft Deviation Constraint
While HDC already places some constraints on the permitted deviation, we can further optimize the deviation in supervisor MPS(REQ, HDC) of the previous section. Quantitative optimization techniques from Markov Decision Processes can be used. (Stocasticity comes from the distribution of inputs to the shield.) The tool DCSynth allows us to specify such optimization using a list of soft requirement formulas with weights. The tool optimizes a supervisor to a sub-supervisor which maximizes the expected value of cumulative weight of soft requirements over next H-steps. This cumulative weight is averaged over all input sequences of length H. See Section 2.3 and [18] for further details. We make use of this H-optimal sub-supervisor computation to get a sub-supervisor which minimizes the expected cumulative deviation over next H-steps. Given the set of output propositions O = {o 1 , . . . , o r }, consider the DCSynth soft-requirement
Thus, non-deviation of any output variable o i = o ′ i at current position contributes a reward 1. This is summed over all output variables to give weight (reward) of the soft requirement. Thus, the weight of the soft requirement Hamming(O, O ′ ) at any position k in a word (ii, oo, oo ′ ) is the value (r − h) where h is the hamming distance between oo[k] and oo ′ [k]. If oo and oo ′ perfectly match at position k then the weight at position k is r, whereas if oo and oo ′ differ in values of say p variables at position k then the weight at the position k is r − p.
By using Hamming(O, O ′ ) as soft requirement and by selecting a horizon value H, we can apply the tool DCSynth to obtain a sub-supervisor
MPHOS( MPS(REQ, HDC), Hamming(O, O ′ ), H ) of the supervisor MPS(REQ, HDC). This sub-supervisor retains only the outputs which maximize the expected accumulated weight of Hamming(O, O ′ ) over next H steps in future. This supervisor is called the shield-supervisor with deviation minimization and denoted by MPHOS(REQ, HDC, H).

Determinization
The reader must note that both the shield-supervisors MPS(REQ, HDC) and MPHOS(REQ, HDC, H) are output non-deterministic. Multiple choice of outputs may satisfy the hard deviation constraints while being H-optimal for the soft deviation constraint. Any arbitrary resolution of the output non-determinism will preserve the invariance guarantees and H-optimality (see [18] ).
In our method, we allow the user to specify a preference ordering ord on the shield outputs 2 O ′ . A lexicographically ordered list of output literals is given as explained in Example 10. A deterministic controller is obtained by retaining only the highest ordered output from the non-deterministic choice of outputs offered by the supervisor. Thus, given a preference ordering ord we can obtain shields (deterministic controllers) Det ord (MPS(REQ, HDC)) and Det ord (MPHOS (REQ, HDC, H) 
Variety of Hard Deviation Constraints and Shield-Types
In Table 1 
We provide some explanation and comments on these specifications.
• The proposition SSEOK denotes that the SSE is not making correctness error where as proposition Deviation denotes that the shield is deviating from the SSE output. The QDDC formula
states that in any observation interval, if the interval begins with no deviation, and there is no error by SSE during the interval, then there is no deviation throughout the interval. This property can be called NoSpuriousDeviation.
It is included as a conjunct in k-Shield V 2 as well as e, d-Shield V 3 .
• Burst-shield (V 0 ) does not enforce any hard deviation constraint. Thus, only hard requirement on the synthesized shield is to meet REQ(I ∪ O, O ′ ) invariantly. However, we can use this together with deviation minimization using the soft deviation constraint Hamming(O, O ′ ). By taking horizon H = 0, we obtain the burst sheild of Wu et al. [21] which locally optimizes deviation at each step without any look-ahead into the future. Larger horizon values give superior shields which improve the probability of non-deviation in long run, as shown by our experiments which are reported later in this paper.
• A k-shield (V 1 ) specifies (as its hard deviation constraint) that for any observation interval the deviation can invariantly happen for at most k cycles. Thus, a burst of deviation has length of at most k cycles. The k-shield (V 1 ) specifies that this property must hold unconditionally. Such a specification is often unrealizable. For example, if SSE makes consecutive errors for more than k cycles, the shield may be forced to deviate for all of these cycles. Hence, several variants of the V 1 shield have been considered.
• The k-stabilizing shield (V 2 ) specifies that the shield may deviate as long as SSE makes errors (even burst errors). Once SSE recovers from deviation (indicated by SSEOK becoming and remaining true), the shield may deviate for at most k cycles. Thus, the shield must recover from deviation within k cycles once SSEOK is established and maintained. Also, there must be no spurious deviation due to conjunct NoSpuriousDeviation. This specification precisely gives the k-stabilizing shield without fail-safe state, originally defined by Konighofer et al. [9] . By a variation of this, the k-stabilizing shield with fail-safe state [9] can also be specified but we omit this here.
• We define a new notion of shield called e, d-shield (V 3 ). This states that in any observation interval if the count of errors by SSE (given by the term (scount !SSEOK)) is at most e then the count of number of cycles with deviations (given by the term (scount Deviation)) is at most d. Thus e errors lead to at most d deviations. Also, there is no spurious deviation due to the conjunct NoSpuriousDeviation.
It may be noted that irrespective of the shield type the synthesized shield have to meet the requirement REQ(I, O ′ ) invariantly as specified by the formula HShield (See Equation 1).
Performance Measurement Metrics and Experiments
In this section we give the experimental results for shield synthesis carried out in our framework. We first benchmark the performance of our tool and compare it with some other tools for shield synthesis in Section 4.1. In Section 4.2 we define some performance measurement metrics for shields and we use these to compare various shield types.
Performance of Tool DCSynth in Shield Synthesis
We have synthesized Burst-shield V 0 with deviation minimization using DCSynth for all the benchmark examples given in [21] . The results are tabulated in Table 2 . All our experiments were conducted on Linux (Ubuntu 18.04) system with Intel i5 64 bit, 2.5 GHz processor and 4 GB memory. The formula automata files of Wu et al. [19] were used in place of QDDC formulas for uniformity. For a comparision with other tools, the results for the k-stabilizing shield synthesis and the Burst-error shield synthesis for the same examples are reproduced directly from Wu et al. [21] . As these are for unknown hardware setup, a direct comparison of the synthesis times with the DCSynth synthesis times is only indicative.
As the table suggests, in most of the cases, the shield synthesized by DCSynth compares favorably with the results reported in literature [21] , both in terms of the size of the shield and the time taken for the synthesis. Recall that DCSynth uses aggressive minimization to obtain smaller shields. As an example, for the specification AMBA G5+6+9e64+10, our tool synthesizes a shield significantly faster and with smaller number of states than the existing tools [2, 21] . 
Comparison between various shield notions
For comparing the performance of shields synthesized with different shield types, we define the following performance metrics.
Expected Value of Non-deviation of a Shield in Long run: A shield is said to be in a non-deviating state if the shield output O ′ matches the SSE output O. A proposition !Deviation holds for such states. We measure the probability of shield being in such states over its long runs, as described below. The construction of the desired DTMC is as follows. The product S × A (D) gives a finite state automaton with the same behaviours as S. Moreover, it is in accepting state exactly when D holds for the past behaviour. (Here A (D) works as a total deterministic monitor automaton for D without restricting S). By assigning uniform discrete probabilities to all the inputs from any state, we obtain the DTMC M uni f (S, D) along with a designated set of accepting states. The DTMC is in accepting state precisely when D holds. Standard techniques from Markov chain analysis allow us to compute the probability (Expected value) of being in the set of accepting states on long runs (steady state) of the DTMC. This gives us the desired value E uni f (S, D). A leading probabilistic model checking tool MRMC implements this computation [7] . In DCSynth, we provide a facility to compute M uni f (S, D) in a format accepted by the tool MRMC. Hence, using DCSynth and MRMC, we are able to compute E uni f (S, D).
The expected value of a shield S being in a non-deviating state over long runs can be computed as E uni f (S,true^<!Deviation>).
Worst Case Burst-Deviation Latency: The worst case burst-deviation latency gives the maximum number of consecutive cycles for which the shield deviates even when the SSE is satisfying the requirement. Thus, it denotes the maximum length of an interval in the behaviour of the shield for which the formula "SSEOK && Deviation" holds invariantly.
Given a Shield S and a QDDC formula D, the latency goal MAX LEN(D, S) computes 
Experiments and Findings
We can use the expected value of deviation and the worst case burst-deviation latency, defined above, for comparing the shields obtained using various shield-types defined in Section 3.4. We synthesized various shields for the correctness requirement ϕ until (n) given in Example 1 with n = 5 and the inputoutput propositions ({r}, {p, q}). The output propositions of synthesized shield are {p ′ , q ′ }. For each shield type V i given in Table 1 , the deterministic shields V i NoDM and V i DM were synthesized as outlined in the last paragraph of Section 3.3. Here V i NoDM denotes shield synthesized without deviation minimization where as V i DM denotes the shield obtained with deviation minimization optimization. The shield-supervisors were determinized with the preference ordering (!q ′ >!p ′ ) on outputs. Table 3 gives the results obtained. We report the number of states of the shield along with the time taken (in seconds) by the tool DCSynth to compute the shield. Moreover, for comparing the performance of the resulting shields, their Expected Value of non-deviation as well as the worst case burst-deviation latency are reported in the table under the columns titled Expected Value and Latency, respectively.
It is observed that with deviation minimization optimization, several different shield types resulted in identical shields, although the time to synthesize them differed. For example, shields in rows numbered 10 to 15 are identical. We indicate such a situation by merging the corresponding rows to a single cell. We give our findings below.
• The k-shield (V 1 ) is unrealizable as expected. See its description in Section 3.4 for an explanation.
All the other shield types are found to be realizable.
• For shield synthesis without deviation minimization, we obtain distinct shields with distinct performance for each shield type. The Burst shield (V 0 ) has the poorest performance (expected nondeviation 0.25 and latency ∞) as it enforces trivial hard deviation requirement true. The best • The performance of the shield considerably improves with the deviation minimization (DM) optimization. Expected value of 0.85 compares well against the best value of 0.74 without deviation minimization. Also burst-deviation latency drops to 0 with DM. We also notice that the performance improves with increase in the horizon value when using DM. This is intuitively clear as the tool performs global optimization across larger number of steps of look-ahead with increased horizon.
• For shield synthesis with deviation minimization optimization, all the different shield types V 0 ,V 2 ,V 3 resulted in identical shield for a given value of horizon H. Thus shields in rows 10-15 (synthesized with H = 0) and rows 16-21 (synthesized with H = 10) are found to be identical. This shows that deviation minimization effectively supersedes the different hard deviation guarantees provided by the HDC. While this is not theoretically guaranteed, our experience with robust controller synthesis also indicates the overwhelming effectiveness of the DM-like optimization [15] .
Discussion and Related Work
In this paper we have presented a logical framework for specifying error-correcting run-time enforcement shields using formulas of logic QDDC. The specification contains a correctness requirement REQ, specifying the desired input-output relation to be maintained, as well as a hard deviation constraint HDC which specifies a constraint on deviation between the system output and the shield output. Our shield synthesis gives a shield which invariantly satisfies both REQ and HDC. Moreover, a powerful optimization globally minimizes the cumulative deviation between the system and the shield output. The idea of error-correcting run-time enforcement shield was proposed in the pioneering work of Bloem et al. [2] , where the notion of k-stabilizing shield (with a synthesis algorithm) was proposed. This was further enhanced by Konighofer et al. [9] . Extension of shield synthesis to liveness properties has also been explored in this paper. Wu et al. [21, 20] defined the burst shield which is capable of handling burst errors. Moreover, they proposed optimizing the shield with the choice of output which locally minimizes the deviation at each stage. In this paper, we have enhanced this with global optimization of cumulative deviation across next H steps.
In our method, the shield is logically specified using QDDC formulas and a uniform method for the synthesis of the shield is proposed. A tool DCSynth implements the synthesis method. Logic QDDC [13, 12, 11] with its interval logic modalities, threshold counting constraints, regular expression like constructs and second-order quantification over temporal variables provides a very rich vocabulary to specify both the system requirements and the deviation constraints. Logic QDDC is a discrete time version of Duration Calculus proposed by Zhou, Hoare and Ravn [5, 4] with known automata theoretic decision and model checking procedures [13, 3, 17, 10] . Using the proposed technique, we have specified the k-stabilizing shield of Konighofer et al. [9] , the burst shield of Wu et al. [21, 20] , as well as a new e, dshield. Moreover, we have measured the performance of the shields resulting from these different criteria in terms of the expected value of deviation in long runs, as well as the worst case burst deviation latency. Our experiments show an overwhelming impact of global deviation minimization on the quality of the shield. At the same time, hard deviation constraints provide a conditional hard guarantee on the worst case deviation. Hence, the combination of hard deviation constraint together with global minimization of deviation is useful.
Konighofer et al. [9] as well as Ehlers and Topku [6] propose controller/shield synthesis technique for optimal achievable value of parameter k in a regular specification. By contrast, our current method requires k to be specified. In our future work, we will address similar optimal parametric synthesis from parameterized QDDC specifications.
